In multilevel systems it is important to avoid unwanted indirect information flow from higher levels to lower levels, namely the so called covert channels. Initial studies of information flow analysis were performed by abstracting away from time and probability. Recently, work has been done in order to consider also aspects either of time or of probability, but not both. In this paper we propose a general framework, based on Probabilistic Timed Automata, where both probabilistic and timing covert channels can be studied. As an application, we study a system with covert channels that we are able to discover by our techniques.
Introduction
In a multilevel system every agent is confined in a bounded security level; information can flow from a certain agent to another agent only if the level of the former is lower than the level of the latter. Access rules can be imposed by the system in order to control direct unwanted transmission from higher levels to lower levels; however, it could be possible to transmit information indirectly by using system side effects. Usually, this kind of indirect transmissions, called covert channels, do not violate the access rules imposed by the system. The existence of covert channels has led to the more general approach of information flow security, which aims at controlling the way information may flow among different entities. The idea is to try to directly control the whole flow of information, rather than only the direct communication among agents. In [10] the authors introduce the notion of non-interference, stating, intuitively, that the low level agents should not be able to deduce anything about the activity of the high level agents. By imposing some information flow rules, it is possible to control direct and indirect leakages, as both of them give rise to unwanted information flows.
In the literature, there are many different definitions of security based on the information flow idea, and each one formulated in some system model (see, e.g., [1, 5, 7-11, 16, 19] ). Most of the properties considered are based on analysis of information flow that does not take into consideration aspects of time or probability, and therefore are not useful to check the existence of probabilistic or timing covert channels. To overcome this, a significant work has been done in order to extend the study by considering either time (see, e.g., [5, 7, 9] ) or probability (see, e.g., [1, 11, 19] ), but, to the best of our knowledge, not both.
In this paper we propose a general framework where both probabilistic and timing covert channels can be studied. For the description of systems we choose the model of Probabilistic Timed Automata. Timed Automata have been introduced by Alur and Dill [3] , extensions with probability have been proposed e.g. in [2, 6, 13, 14] . We introduce a particular class of Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) well-suited for the analysis of information flow security properties.
The framework of PTA allows one to specify timed systems showing a probabilistic behavior in an intuitive and succinct way. Therefore, within the framework of PTA, where time and probabilities are taken into consideration, the modeler can describe, in the same specification, different aspects of a system and analyze on a single model real-time properties, performance and reliability properties (by using classical model checking techniques) and finally information flow security properties able to detect both probabilistic and timing covert channels.
Probabilistic Timed Automata
Let us assume a set X of positive real variables called clocks. A valuation over X is a mapping v : X → IR ≥0 assigning real values to clocks. For a valuation v and a time value t ∈ IR ≥0 , let v + t denote the valuation such that
The set of constraints over X, denoted Φ(X), is defined by the following grammar: φ ::= x ∼ c | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | true, where φ ranges over Φ(X), x ∈ X, c ∈ Q and ∼ ∈ {<, ≤, =, =, >, ≥}.
We write v |= φ when the valuation v satisfies the constraint φ. Formally, Σ is a finite alphabet of actions.
X is a finite set of positive real variables called clocks.
Q is a finite set of states and q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state. 
is a probability function such that π(e) is the probability of performing the transition e. We require that e∈start(q) π(e) = 1.
A configuration of A is a pair (q, v), where q ∈ Q is a state of A, and v is a valuation over X. The initial configuration of A is represented by (q 0 , 0) and the set of all the configurations of A is denoted with S A .
There is a discrete transition step from a configuration
there is a transition e = (q i , a, φ, B, q j ) ∈ δ such that v i |= φ, and
There is a continuous timed step from a configuration
Given a configuration s = (q i , v i ), with Adm(s) = {(q i , a, φ, B, q) ∈ δ | v i |= φ} we represent the set of transitions that an automaton could execute from configuration s, and we say that a transition in Adm(s) is enabled in s. Given two configurations s i = (q i , v i ), s j = (q j , v j ) and given a ∈ Σ∪{τ } we represent with Adm(s i , a,
} the set of transitions that lead from configuration s i to configuration s j through a transition step labeled with a.
; we denote with S T the set of terminal configurations.
For configurations s i = (q i , v i ), s j = (q j , v j ) and α ∈ Σ ∪ {τ } ∪ IR >0 , we define with P (s i , α, s j ) the probability of reaching configuration s j from configuration s i through a step
The probability of executing a transition step from a configuration s is chosen according to the values returned by the function π among all the transitions enabled in s, while we set to 1 the probability of executing a timed step labeled with t ∈ IR >0 . Intuitively, an automaton chooses non-deterministically whether to execute a transition step (selected probabilistically among all the transitions enabled in s) or to let time pass performing a timed step.
An execution fragment starting from s 0 is a finite sequence of timed and transition steps σ = s 0
we denote the set of execution fragments and with ExecF rag(s) the set of execution fragments starting from s. We define last(σ) = s k and |σ| = k. The execution fragment σ is called maximal iff last(σ) ∈ S T . For any j < k, with σ j we define the sequence of steps s 0
An execution is either a maximal execution fragment or an infinite sequence s 0
−→ . . .. We denote with Exec the set of executions and with Exec(s) the set of executions starting from s. Finally, let σ ↑ denote the set of executions σ ′ such that σ ≤ pref ix σ ′ , where prefix is the usual prefix relation over sequences.
Executions and execution fragments of a PTA arise by resolving both the nondeterministic and the probabilistic choices [13] . To resolve the nondeterministic choices of a PTA, we introduce now schedulers of PTAs.
A scheduler of a PTA A = (Σ, X, Q, q 0 , δ, π) is a partial function F from Exec to IR >0 . For a scheduler F of a PTA A we define ExecF rag F (resp. Exec F ) as the set of execution fragments (resp. executions) σ = s 0
A scheduler should also respect the nonZeno condition of divergent times. Formally we have that for any infinite sequence σ = s 0
Assuming the basic notions of probability theory (see e.g. [12] ) we define the probability space on the executions starting in a given configuration s ∈ S A as follows. Given a scheduler F , let Exec F (s) be the set of executions starting in s, ExecF rag F (s) be the set of execution fragments starting in s, and Σ F F ield (s) be the smallest sigma field on Exec F (s) that contains the basic cylinders σ ↑, where σ ∈ ExecF rag F (s). The probability measure P rob F is the unique measure on Σ F F ield (s) such that P rob F (σ ↑) = P (σ). In the following, A is a PTA, F is a scheduler for A,α stands for α if α ∈ Σ ∪ IR >0 and for ε (the empty string) if α = τ , s ∈ S A and C ⊆ S A . Consider now Exec F (τ * α , C), the set of executions that lead to a configuration in C via a sequence in τ * α . We define Exec F (s, τ * α , C) = Exec(τ * α , C)∩ Exec F (s). Finally, given a scheduler F , we define the probability
Weak bisimulation
The bisimulation of a system by another system is based on the idea of mu-tual step-by-step simulation. Intuitively, two systems A and A ′ are bisimilar, if whenever one of the two systems executes a certain action and reaches a configuration s, the other system is able to simulate this single step by executing the same action and reaching a configuration s ′ which is again bisimilar to s. A weak bisimulation is a bisimulation which does not take into account τ (internal) moves. Hence, whenever a system simulates an action of the other system, it can also execute some internal τ actions before and after the execution of that action. A branching bisimulation is, instead, a weak bisimulation where τ moves are allowed only before the execution of the action to simulate. To abstract away from τ moves, Milner [18] introduces the notion of observable step, which consists of a single visible action α preceded and followed by an arbitrary number (including zero) of internal moves. Such moves are described by a weak transition relation =⇒ by means of the probability P rob(s, τ * α, s ′ ).
Definition 2 Let A = (Σ, X, Q, q 0 , δ, π) be a probabilistic timed automaton. A weak bisimulation on A is an equivalence relation R on S A such that, for all (s, s ′ ) ∈ R, C ∈ S A /R and schedulers F , there exists a scheduler
, and vice versa. Two configurations s, s ′ are called weakly bisimilar on A (denoted s ≈ A s ′ ) iff (s, s ′ ) ∈ R for some weak bisimulation R.
Definition 3 Two probabilistic timed automata
, where the valuation 0 is defined over all clocks of the set X ∪ X ′ .
In [15] we have given an algorithm that resorts to the theory of regions of timed automata [3] in order to decide weak bisimulation. Along the line of [15] we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4 It is decidable to check whether two configurations or two probabilistic timed automata are weak bisimilar.

Auxiliary Operators for Probabilistic Timed Automata
We assume two probabilistic timed automata A 1 = (Σ, X 1 , Q 1 , r 0 , δ 1 , π 1 ) and A 2 = (Σ, X 2 , Q 2 , u 0 , δ 2 , π 2 ) with Q 1 ∩ Q 2 = ∅ and X 1 ∩ X 2 = ∅. We also assume a set L ⊆ Σ of synchronization actions. Finally, given a transition e = (q, a, φ, B, q ′ ) ∈ δ i , with π ia (e) we denote the normalized probability of executing transition e with respect to all other transitions starting from q and labelled with a, i.e. π ia (e) =
, where start a i (q) denotes the set of transitions in δ i with q as source state and a as labelling action, i.e. the set
Definition 5 The parallel composition of two PTA A 1 and A 2 , with respect to the synchronization set L and the advancing speed parameter
is given by the cartesian product Q 1 × Q 2 of the states of the two automata A 1 and A 2 , while the set of clocks X is given by the union
and π are obtained by the following rules:
If from state r the automaton A 1 has a transition e 1 = (r, a, φ, B, r ′ ) with action a ∈ L and probability π 1 (e 1 ) = p ′ , then A 1 || p L A 2 has a transition e = ((r, u), a, φ, B, (r ′ , u)) ∈ δ with probability π ′ (e) = p·p ′ .
If from state u the automaton A 2 has a transition e 2 = (u, a, φ, B, u ′ ) with action a ∈ L and probability π 2 (e 2 ) = p ′ , then A 1 || p L A 2 has a transition e = ((r, u), a, φ, B, (r, u ′ )) ∈ δ with probability π ′ (e) = (1 − p) · p ′ .
If from state r the automaton A 1 has a transition e 1 = (r, a, φ 1 , B 1 , r ′ ) with action a ∈ L and probabilities π 1 (e 1 ) = p ′ and π 1a (e 1 ) =p ′ , and from state u the automaton A 2 has a transition e 2 (u, a, φ 2 , B 2 , u ′ ) with probabilities π 2 (e 2 ) = p ′′ and π 2a (e 2 ) =p ′′ , A 1 and A 2 can synchronize and therefore
Given such a definition of parallel composition, whenever A 1 and A 2 synchronize they give rise to an internal action τ . Note that, chosen a transition e 1 (e 2 ) with label a ∈ L of automaton A 1 (A 2 ) the transition e 2 (e 1 ) of A 2 (A 1 ) that synchronizes with e 1 (e 2 ) is chosen according to the probability π 2a (e 2 ) (π 1a (e 1 )) normalized with respect to all the other transitions labelled with a. Besides, according to Definition 1, it holds that e∈start(q) π(e) ∈ {0, 1} for each state q of A 1 || p L A 2 . This is done due to the last rule, that uses the auxiliary structure π ′ to compute the normalized probabilities in π.
We now assume A = (Σ, X, Q, q 0 , δ, π) and L ⊆ Σ.
Definition 7 The restriction of a probabilistic timed automaton A with respect to the set of actions L is given by
for all e = (q, a, φ, B, q ′ ) ∈ δ ′ .
Definition 8
The hiding of a probabilistic timed automaton A with respect to the set of actions L is given by A/L = (Σ, X, Q, q 0 , δ ′ , π) where each transition e = (q, a, φ, B, q ′ ) with a ∈ L is replaced by the transition e ′ = (q, τ, φ, B, q ′ ), where π(e ′ ) = π(e).
Proposition 9 Given a PTA
A, A \ L and A/L are PTA for all L ⊆ Σ.
Security Properties
A multilevel system interacts with agents confined in different levels of clearance. In order to analyze the information flow between parties with different levels of confidentiality, the set of visible actions is partitioned into high level actions and low level actions. Formally, we assume the set of possible ac-
In the following, with l, l ′ . . . and h, h ′ , . . . we denote actions of Σ L and Σ H respectively. With Γ H and Γ L we denote the set of high level agents and low level agents. Formally, an au-
For simplicity, we specify only two-level systems. More levels can by dealt with by iteratively grouping them in two clusters. A low level agent is able to observe the execution of all the steps labelled with actions in Σ L and all the timed steps. The basic idea of non-interference is that the high level does not interfere with the low level if the effects of high level communications are not visible by a low level agent. Finally, an important assumption when dealing with non-interference analysis is that a system is considered to be secure (no information flow can occur) if there is no interaction with high level agents (if high level actions are prevented).
Probabilistic Timed Non-interference
We say that a probabilistic timed automaton A satisfies the Probabilistic Timed Non-interference property (PTNI) if high level agents are not able to interfere with the observable behavior of the system from the low level point of view. Formally PTNI can be formulated as follows. A \ Σ H represents the isolated system, where all high level actions are prevented. Such a system is considered secure due to the notion of non-interference.
If the observational behavior of the isolated system is equal to the behavior of A/Σ H , representing the system which communicates with high level agents in an invisible manner for the low agents point of view, PTA A is PTNI secure. This property, defined in an environment where both probability and time are studied, is able to catch information flow that may occur either due to the probabilistic behavior of the system or due to the time when actions occur.
Proposition 11 It is decidable to check whether a PTA A ∈ PTNI.
Proof. By the decidability of our weak bisimulation (see Proposition 4) and by the computable definitions of the operators of hiding and restriction.
Example 12
In Figure 1 we show a case of probabilistic information flow. Abstracting away from probability, the system A could be considered secure (in a purely nondeterministic setting, in both A/Σ H and A \ Σ H a low level agent can observe the action l or the sequence ll ′ without further information about the execution of h). In a probabilistic framework, given p + r + q = 1, action h interferes with the probability of observing either a single l or the sequence ll ′ . Formally, in A \ Σ H , a low level agent observes either the single l with probability p + r or the sequence ll ′ with probability q. However, in A/Σ H the event l is observed with probability p and the sequence ll ′ with probability r + q. As a consequence, A/Σ H ≈ A \ Σ H , so that the PTNI property reveals the probabilistic covert channel.
Example 13
In Figure 2 we show a case of timing information flow. Abstracting away from time, the system A could be considered secure (in a purely untimed nondeterministic setting, in both A/Σ H and A \ Σ H a low level agent 
Probabilistic Timed Non Deducibility on Composition
In [8] Focardi and Gorrieri promote the classification of a set of properties capturing the idea of information flow and non-interference. The Non Deducibility on Composition property (NDC) states that a system A in isolation has not to be altered when considering all the potential interactions of A with the high level agents of the external environment. We consider a notion of NDC called Probabilistic Timed Non Deducibility on Composition (PTNDC).
As we have seen, A/Σ H represents the observable behavior of A from a low level agent point of view (i.e. the isolated system where all high level actions are hidden). System (A|| p L Π) \ Σ H represents, instead, system A communicating with the high agent Π and then prevented by the execution of other high level actions. If the observational behavior of the isolated system is equal to the behavior of the system communicating with any high level agent, PTA A satisfies the PTNDC security property.
Proof. Consider Π = (∅, ∅, {q}, q, ∅, π) ∈ Γ H , i.e. an automaton representing a high level agent which does not perform any transition, and consider then the set Theorem 15 and Example 16 show that the PTNI property is not able to detect some potential deadlock due to high level activities, exactly as put in evidence in [8] . For this reason we resort to the PTNDC property, which implies PTNI, in order to capture these finer undesirable behaviors.
It is worth noticing that, as it happens for the analogous properties defined in [1, 8, 9] , the above definition of the PTNDC property is difficult to use in practice because of the universal quantification on the high level agents. Decidability of PTNDC depends, in fact, on the possibility of reducing all the high level automata in Γ H to a finite case suitable for the particular automaton A we would like to study.
An Application
As an application we consider a network device, also studied in [9] in a timed framework, that manages, following a mutual exclusion policy, the access to a shared buffer. Assuming that the agents on the network are classified as low and high level agents, the device implements the no-write-down no-read-up policy [10] . Intuitively, the policy states that high level users can only read the buffer, while low level users can only write on it. Such a policy avoids direct information flow from high level to low level, however malicious agents can exploit some covert channel in order to transmit information indirectly. For example, a low level user could get information about the high level activity by observing the amount of time the device is locked (non accessible by the low level) when high agents are reading, or by observing the frequencies with which high level agents make access on it. We would like to check whether some covert channel can be exploited by giving a specification of the network device, and then by checking the PTNDC property.
In the following we consider only a low level user and a high level user communicating with the network device. We assume that the low level user is always ready to write in the buffer, so we consider an agent that infinitely waits for a grant from the device and then writes in the buffer. In this manner we are considering a low level user that continuously monitors the activity of the device. We also assume that the entire procedure of receiving a grant in the network and writing in the buffer is executed in a time n. In Figure 4 , we model the specification of a simple device (see the PTA B). Actions req H , read H , grant L and write L model respectively high level read requests, high level reads, low level write grants and low level writes. The set Σ H of high level actions is {req H , read H }. The device B is always ready to accept an access request from the high level agent with probability 1 2 and to grant a write access to the low level user with the same probability. Obviously, we always consider the device composed with a high level agent according to || p L (we assume p = 1 2 and L = {req H , read H }). On the one hand, when the device is composed with a high level agent that performs action req H with probability 1, it synchronizes with the high agent accepting his request with probability . On the other hand, if the high level agent does not perform req H , the composed system performs action grant L with probability 1. As a consequence we can find out the following covert channels. Consider the high agent Π 1 of Figure 4 , which executes a read request without performing the reading afterwards. System (B|| p L Π 1 ) \ Σ H reaches a deadlock state that is not reached by B/Σ H . In this way, the high level agent could transmit the bit 0 or 1 by alternatively blocking or not the device. Such a covert channel can be detected by the PTNDC property, in fact we have that
Another interesting covert channel arises if one considers Π 2 , which locks the buffer and executes a reading only after a time k. A low level user observing the behavior of (B|| p L Π 2 ) \ Σ H does not receive any grant access for a time k when a req H action is performed. In this way the high level agent could indirectly transmit value k to the low level user. We obviously have again that
The two covert channels introduced above could be avoided by introducing a timeout mechanism which releases the device if read H is not performed and by always releasing the device after a fixed amount of time has passed. In Fig- ure 5 we show a device B ′ that accepts a high level request, and uses a clock x as timer and t as timeout. When it executes action req H the timer is set to 0, action read H could be performed only when x < t, and when x reaches value t the device unlocks the buffer going back to q 0 . When transitions starting from a given state have disjoint conditions we omit probabilities since their execution depends on the time configuration, rather than on the effective probability. The timing covert channels shown in the previous case could not be exploited anymore, however device B ′ is still insecure. In fact the device is unavailable for the fixed amount of time when a high level access is performed, and this is clearly observable by the low level user that has to wait the termination of the high level request before obtaining access to the buffer. This represents a typical situation where the unavailability of a shared resource can be encoded as 0 or 1 in order to transmit data. Such a situation is captured by the PTNDC property by considering again the automaton Π 2 and assuming k < t. In fact we have again that
The capacity of such a covert channel could be reduced, but not totally avoided, by considering a buffer that probabilistically locks himself without any high level request. In this manner the low level user could not be sure whether the buffer is really locked by the high user or not. In Figure 5 , B ′′ represents a device that behaves in such a manner, locking himself with a probability r. As we have said, this does not avoid entirely the covert channel, but the knowledge the low level user acquires is affected by some uncertainty. In fact, if the device is locked, the low level user could deduce that the high user locked the device with a certain probability while with probability r the device has locked himself for masking the higher user's activity.
We can completely hide the high level activity to the low level user by partitioning into two sessions the time in which users can access the buffer. During a low session, lasting a fixed amount of time n, only the low level user can access the buffer, then the device goes to the high session, where access is reserved, for the same amount of time, to the high level user. This makes impossible for the low level user to discover something about the high level activity, since the same fixed amount of time is reserved to the high session even if the high user does nothing. In Figure 6 we specify a buffer B s that behaves in such a manner: the buffer is reserved for a time t to the low level user and to the high level user alternatively. Automaton B s is PTNDC, in fact, for every possible high level user Π, (B s || p L Π) \ Σ H ≈ B c ≈ B s /Σ H . Intuitively, automaton B c of Figure 6 represents the automaton resulting after the parallel composition between B s and any high level user Π, and, therefore, B c is weak bisimilar to B s composed with any possible high level user Π. Finally, it easy to see that B c ≈ B s /Σ H .
Conclusions
The classical theory of non-interference must be extended to cope with real systems which may exhibit probabilistic and timing covert channels that are not captured by standard security models. In this paper we have developed a general framework where both probability and time are taken into account. By defining some information flow security property, we have shown how to detect with our model both probabilistic and timing covert channels.
